Some thoughts on post-election Corbynmania

Far from Theresa May's expectations, the general election has led to sea change as far as public perceptions of Jeremy Corbyn is concerned. As for why this might be the case, this Times article eloquently describes how it is, at least in part, down to Corbyn's ability to change his mind on things he's said in the past. He has come out in favour of second-use of nuclear weapons, condemning the IRA, and the police's shoot-to-kill policy.

The 2015-2016 period of Corbyn's leadership has been marked by his inability to converse and mediate between the different wings of his party, eventually leading to a state of affairs where his Shadow Cabinet is bereft of the most notable, stalwart members of his party - either because they resigned, because they could not be persuaded to take up positions, or because Corbyn chose not to offer them.

However, the mood within the party appears to have changed decisively since the snap election was called. In the midst of mass mobilisation and unprecedented morale, Corbyn has gently reshaped his political compass in order to make his party more electorally palatable on a national level.

This, of course, is a reasonable state of affairs. People change their minds. The overton window shifts. This isn't the first time I've written here that the Conservatives pledged to match Labour spending plans in 2007. Political parties are malleable entities. Nevertheless, Corbyn avoids being labelled as a rehash of Miliband, because the manifesto retained hardline stances on nationalisation, national investment, and tax policy. Any concerns that Corbyn's compromise has tainted him are false. 

Now, I want to consider what this tells us about the future for the Labour Party, and whether we're right to continue listening to those who decry Corbyn as untenable - we've all been there, in fairness.

The attacks aimed at Corbyn between 2015 and the calling of the snap election have been somewhat negated. First and foremost, those who called out Corbyn's stances as 'unelectable' have been proven decisively wrong. Although it's true that Corbyn did not win the election, it's relatively straightforward to argue that he did better than leaders who won a similar number of seats, such as Brown and Kinnock. It's not enough to say he won a much higher percentage of the vote (40%); it's about how that vote was distributed. If it were concentrated entirely in Labour strongholds, it would be easy to attack Corbyn on the basis that, even with a high vote share, he could not win an election outright on such a left wing platform.

However, the reverse was the case: Corbyn won votes across the country, including in some seats that turned red in surprising circumstances (Kensington and Canterbury being the two most notable examples). Seats thought to be under threat such as Tooting are now safely Labour, and more seats have become marginal - meaning the swing required for Labour to win an election has been reduced to only 3.6% - and that's excluding the potential confidence and supply arrangements that could easily be made with the SNP or a pragmatic Liberal Democrat leader, making the threshold even lower. So, those who cite the Private Eye and call Corbyn's performance lacklustre on that basis are wrong for three reasons:

First, the Labour Party is currently experiencing a resurgence, both in the public eye and at the polls, compared to 2010 where it was rapidly losing momentum. Second, the margin required for Labour to win has massively decreased, the seats within reach are abundant, and Labour has easier access to agreements for minority governments than Theresa May.

Furthermore, the landscape compared to 2010 is completely different: the Liberal Democrats were prepared to work with the Conservatives and the SNP wasn't a true British electoral force yet. Now conditions are overwhelmingly in Labour's favour to form the next government.

Third, it's the Private Eye. Ian Hislop is making a joke. Using it as serious political schadenfreude might be taking things a little too far.

Despite this evidence that Jeremy Corbyn's electability is now very much real, it could still be claimed that the man has seriously problematic views that limit his suitability for office.

...Except it couldn't, really - at least not any more.

The thing is, Corbyn's bounce at the polls isn't simply a consequence of the Tories' disastrous dementia tax or Labour's platitudes to young people. The issues associated with Corbyn, such as issues with the IRA and issues with nuclear weapons, haven't just been mitigated or forgotten in the minds of potential Labour voters. It's due to a conscious effort on the part of Corbyn's campaign office - and, indeed, the man himself - to convince the electorate that he doesn't really believe the things he might have done in the past, whether it's media spin or not.

This tactic has proven largely successful, leading to stances that are still largely to the left of Blairism and Milibandism (Miliband backed Trident unilaterally and held a broadly New Labour stance on foreign affairs), but the important thing is that Corbyn is still prepared to stand up and defend exactly why he believes so strongly in peaceful dialogue or the second-response tactic.

It's the confidence with which Corbyn is able to put his party's manifesto pledges forward that makes people more prepared to back them in principle; he can make people believe that the new leftism his manifesto has adopted is something he genuinely believes in, even if he's not a dictator.

Perhaps if Theresa May could convince the public she really believes in a 'no deal' Brexit, the public would vote in her spectre of a majority. In the meantime, we ought to recognise that electability is not zero-sum; Corbyn's palatability as a potential Prime Minister is exactly that to which he owes his surprise 'victory'.